We derive new limitations on the information rate and the average information rate of secret sharing schemes for access structure represented by graphs. We give the rst proof of the existence of access structures with optimal information rate and optimal average information rate less that 1=2 + , where is an arbitrary positive constant. We also consider the problem of testing if one of these access structures is a sub-structure of an arbitrary access structure and we show that this problem is NP-complete. We provide several general lower bounds on information rate and average information rate of graphs. In particular, we show that any graph with n vertices admits a secret sharing scheme with information rate ((logn)=n).
Introduction
A secret sharing scheme is a method to distribute a secret s among a set of participants P in such a way that only quali ed subsets of P can reconstruct the value of s whereas any other subset of P; non-quali ed to know s; cannot determine anything about the value of the secret. We brie y recall the results on secret sharing schemes that are more closely related to the topics of this paper. Shamir 36] and Blackley 3] were the rst to consider the problem of secret sharing and gave secret sharing schemes where each subset A of P of size jAj k can reconstruct the secret, and any subset A of participants of size jAj < k have absolutely no information on the secret. These schemes are known as (n; k) threshold schemes; the value k is the threshold of the scheme and n is the size of P.
Ito, Saito and Nishizeki 25] considered a more general framework and showed how to realize a secret sharing scheme for any access structure. An access structure is a family of all subsets of P which are quali ed to recover the secret. In case of (n; k) threshold schemes the access structure consists of all subsets of P that have size greater than or equal to k. Their technique requires that the size of set where the shares are taken be very large compared to the size of the set where the secret is chosen. Benaloh and Leichter 2] proposed a technique to realize a secret sharing scheme for any access structure more e cient than Ito, Saito and Nishizeki's methodology. Benaloh and Leichter showed that there exist access structures for which any secret sharing scheme must give to some participant a share which is from a domain strictly larger than that of the secret. Brickell and Davenport 12] analyzed ideal secret sharing schemes in terms of matroids. An ideal secret sharing scheme is a scheme for which the shares are taken from a set that has the same size of the set where the secret is chosen. In particular, in case the access structure consists of only those subsets of participants containing an edge of a given graph G, Brickell and Davenport 12] proved that an ideal secret sharing scheme exists if and only if G is a complete multipartite graph.
Equivalently, if we de ne the information rate of an access structure as the ratio between the size of the secret and that of the largest share given to any participant, Brickell and Davenport's result can be stated saying that a graph has information rate 1 if and only if it is a complete multipartite graph.
The problem of establishing bounds on the size of the shares to be given to participants in secret sharing schemes, or equivalently on the information rate, is one of the basic problem in the area and has received considerable attention by several researchers. The practical relevance of this issue is based on the following observations: Firstly, the security of any system tends to degrade as the amount of information that must be kept secret, i.e., the shares of the participants, increases. Secondly, if the shares given to participants are too long, the memory requirements for the participants will be too severe and, at the same time, the shares distribution algorithms will become ine cient. Therefore, it is important to derive signi cative upper and lower bounds on the information rate for classes of access structures.
Brickell and Stinson 14] gave several upper and lower bounds on the information rate of access structures based on graphs. Stinson in 41] presented new lower bounds on general access structures. Capocelli, De Santis, Gargano, and Vaccaro 15] gave the rst example of access structures with information rate bounded away from 1.
Blundo, De Santis, Stinson, and Vaccaro 9] analyzed the information rate and the average information rate of secret sharing schemes based on graphs. The average information rate is the ratio between the secret size and the arithmetic mean of the size of the shares for such schemes. They proved the existence of a gap in the values of information rates of graphs, more precisely they strengthened the above quoted result of Brickell and Davenport 12] , proving that if a graph G with n vertices is not a complete multipartite graph then any secret sharing scheme for it has information rate not greater than 2=3 and average information rate not greater than n=(n + 1):
These upper bounds arise by applying entropy argument due to Capocelli, De Santis, Gargano, and Vaccaro 15] .
A discussion of the best bounds known so far and of our improvements is presented in the technical sections of the paper.
The recent survey by Stinson 40] contains an uni ed description of recent results in the area of secret sharing schemes. For di erent approaches to the study of secret sharing schemes, for schemes with \extended capabilities" as disenrollment, fault-tolerance, and pre-positioning and for a complete bibliography we recommend the survey article by Simmons 39] .
We also mention some \extended capabilities" of secret sharing schemes that have been studied. In 1] and 8] has been addressed the problem of designing secret sharing schemes having the additional feature that quali ed minorities can forbid any other set of participants from reconstructing the secret. These schemes are referred to as secret sharing schemes with \veto" capability. Ingemarsson and Simmons 24] solve the question of how to set up a secret sharing scheme in the absence of a trusted party. Prepositioned schemes are studied in 38]. The idea of protecting against cheating by one or more participants is addressed in 30, 43, 35, 37, 13, 16] . In 4] the authors investigated threshold schemes that permit disenrollment of participants. Secret sharing schemes in which the dealer has the feature of being able (after a preprocessing stage) to activate a particular access structure out of a given set and/or to allow the participants to reconstruct different secrets (in di erent time instants) by sending to all participants the same broadcast message have been analyzed in 6]. Schemes for sharing several non-independent secrets simultaneously have been analyzed in 10]; whereas, schemes where di erent secrets are associated with di erent subsets of participants are considered in 26] and 7]. Recently Naor and Shamir 33] considered a type of cryptographic scheme that is able to decode concealed images without any cryptographic computation. They extended it into a visual variant of the (n; k) secret sharing problem.
In this paper we derive new limitations on the information rate and the average information rate for access structures represented by graphs. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally de ne secret sharing schemes using an information theoretical framework 1 . We also de ne the optimal (average) information rate of an access structure A by using the entropy approach.
In Section 3 we prove new upper bounds on the information rate and the average information rate. These bounds are obtained by using the entropy approach introduced in 15] and are the best possible for the considered structures since we exhibit secret sharing schemes that meet the bounds. In particular, we give the rst proof of the existence of access structures with information rate and average information rate strictly less that 2=3. This solves a problem of 9]. In Section 3.1 we also consider the problem of e ciently testing if one of these low{information{rate access structures is a sub-structure of an arbitrary access structure. This is important since it would immediately give an e cient way to get upper bounds on the information rate for classes of access structures. Unfortunately, we show that above decision problem is NP{complete. In Section 4 we consider the problem of nding good lower bounds on the information rate and the average information rate for access structures based on graphs and we give several general lower bounds that improve on previously known results. In particular, we show that any graph on n vertices of maximum degree d admits a secret sharing scheme with information rate 1=(dd=2e + 1 ? dd=2e=n). We provide a scheme for any tree with n internal vertices having information rate equal to n=(2n ? 1) . Finally, we show that any graph with n vertices admits a secret sharing scheme with information rate ((log n)=n) and any graph with n vertices and m edges admits of a secret sharing scheme with average information rate n log n m log n 2 m :
2 Secret Sharing Schemes A secret sharing scheme permits a secret to be shared among a set P of n participants in such a way that only quali ed subsets of P can recover the secret, but any non-quali ed subset has absolutely no information on the secret. An access structure A is the set of all subsets of P that can recover the secret.
De nition 2.1 Let P be a set of participants, a monotone access structure A on P is a subset A 2 P ; such that A 2 A; A A 0 P ) A 0 2 A: De nition 2.2 Let P a set of participants and A 2 P : The closure of A, denoted by cl(A), is the set cl(A) = fCjB 2 A and B C Pg: For a monotone access structure A we have A = cl(A):
Let S be the set of secrets, fp S (s)g s2S be a probability distribution on S, and let a secret sharing scheme for secrets in S be xed. For any participant P 2 P, let us denote by K(P) the set of all possible shares given to participant P. Suppose a dealer D wants to a share the secret s 2 S among the participants in P (we will assume that D 6 2 P). He does this by giving each participant P 2 P a share from K(P) chosen according to some, non necessarily uniform, probability distribution. Given a set of participants A = fP i 1 ; : : :; P ir g P, denote by K(A) = K(P i 1 ) K(P ir ).
We represent, as in 42], a secret sharing scheme by a collection of distribution rules. A distribution rule is a function f : P fDg ! K(P) S which satis es the conditions f(D) 2 S and f(P i ) 2 K(P i ), for i = 1; 2; : : :; n. A distribution rule f represents a possible distribution of shares to the participants, where f(D) is the secret being shared, and f(P i ) is the share given to P i . If F is a family of distribution rules and s 2 S, then F s = ff 2 F : f(D) = sg is the family of all distribution rules having s as the secret. If s 2 S is the value of the secret that D wants to share, then D will randomly choose a distribution rule f 2 F s , according to some probability distribution, and use f to distribute shares to the participants.
The family of distribution rules F can also be depicted as a matrix M, each row of which corresponds to one distribution rule. One column of M will be indexed by D, and the remaining columns are indexed by the members of P.
Any secret sharing scheme for secrets in S and a probability distribution fp S (s)g s2S naturally induce a probability distribution on K(A), for any A P. Denote such probability distribution by fp K(A) (a)g a2K(A) . Finally, denote by H(S) the entropy of fp S (s)g s2S and by H(A) the entropy of fp K(A) (a)g a2K(A) , for any A 2 P.
In terms of the probability distribution on the secret and on the shares given to participants, we say that a secret sharing scheme is a perfect secret sharing scheme, or simply a secret sharing scheme, for the monotone access structure A 2 P if 1. Any subset A P of participants enabled to recover the secret can compute the secret: If A 2 A then for all a 2 K(A) with p K(A) (a) > 0 a unique secret s 2 S exists such that p(sja) = 1.
2. Any subset A P of participants not enabled to recover the secret has no information on the secret value: If A 6 2 A then for all s 2 S and for all a 2 A, it holds p(sja) = p S (s). Property 1: means that the value of the shares held by A 2 A completely determines the secret s 2 S. Notice that the property 2: means that the probability that the secret is equal to s given that the shares held by A 6 2 A are a, is the same as the a priori probability of the secret s. Therefore, no amount of knowledge of shares of participants not quali ed to reconstruct the secret enables a Bayesian opponent to modify an a priori guess regarding which the secret is.
Following the approach of 27], 29], and 15] we can restate above conditions 1. and 2. using the information measures listed in Appendix A. Therefore, we say that a secret sharing scheme is a sharing of the secrets in S among participants in P such that 1 0 : Any subset A P of participants enabled to recover the secret can compute the secret: Formally, for all A 2 A, it holds H(SjA) = 0. 2 0 : Any subset A P of participants not enabled to recover the secret has no information on the secret value:
Formally, for all A 6 2 A, it holds H(SjA) = H(S).
Notice that H(SjA) = 0 means that each set of values of the shares in A corresponds to a unique value of the secret. In fact, by de nition, H(SjA) = 0 is equivalent to the fact that for all a 2 K(A) with p K(A) (a) > 0 a unique s 2 S exists such that p(sja) = 1. Moreover, H(SjA) = H(S) is equivalent to state that S and K(A) are statistically independent, i.e., for all a 2 K(A) and for all s 2 S; it holds p(sja) = p S (s) and therefore the knowledge of a gives no information about the secret.
The Size of the Shares
One of the basic problems in the eld of secret sharing schemes is to derive bounds on the amount of information that must be kept secret. This is important from the practical point of view since the security of any system degrades as the amount of secret information increases.
Let P be a set of n participants and A 2 P be an access structure on P. Di erent measures of the amount of secret information that must be distributed in a secret sharing scheme are possible. If we are interested in limiting the maximum size of shares for each participant (i.e., the maximum quantity of secret information that must be given to any participant), then a worst-case measure of the maximum of H(P) over all P 2 P naturally arises. To analyze such cases we use the information rate of A de ned below. Given a set of secrets S, a non-trivial probability distribution S on S, and a xed secret sharing scheme for A, we de ne
This measure was introduced by Brickell and Stinson 14] when the probability distributions over the secret and the shares are uniform. In such a case the information rate reduces to log jSj=max P2P log jK(P)j; and correspond to the ratio between the size of the secret (measured in bits) and that of the largest share given to any participant. The optimal information rate of the access structure A is then de ned as:
where Q is the space of all non-trivial probability distributions S and T is the space of all secret sharing schemes for the access structure A. In 27] and 15] it has been proved that in any secret sharing scheme the relation H(P) H(S) holds for any P 2 P. Since H(P) = H(S), for any P 2 P, is the optimal situation we refer to such a scheme as an ideal scheme.
In many cases it is preferable to limit the sum of the size of shares given to all participants.
In such a case the arithmetic mean of the H(P), for P 2 P, is a more appropriate measure. We de ne the average information rate as follows. Given a set of secrets S, a non-trivial probability distribution S on S, and a xed secret sharing scheme for A, we de ne e (A; S ; ) = H(S)
This measure was introduced in 5], 31], and 32] when an uniform probability distribution on the set of secrets is assumed. In such a case the average information rate reduces to jPj log jSj= P P2P log jK(P)j.
Blundo, De Santis, Stinson, and Vaccaro 9] analyzed secret sharing schemes by means of this measure, when the probability distributions over the secret and the shares are uniform. If the secret and the shares are chosen under a uniform probability distribution, considering previous measure is equivalent to consider the \average size" of the shares assigned to each participant to realize a secret sharing scheme. The optimal average information rate of the access structure A is then where Q is the space of all non-trivial probability distributions S and T is the space of all secret sharing schemes for the access structure A. It is clear that, for the same secret sharing scheme and non-trivial probability distribution P S on the secret, the information rate is no greater than the average information rate e , that is e and e = if and only if all H(P); for P 2 P, have the same value. In case the access structure A coincides with the closure of the edge-set of some graph G(V (G); E(G)), we will identify A with the graph G. As done in 9] we denote, for a graph G; the optimal information rate with (G) and the average information rate with e (G):
Auxiliary Results
In this section we recall some auxiliary results. We will improve some of them in the next sections and we will use others in our constructions. Brickell and Stinson 14] proved the following lower bound on the information rate for any graph of maximum degree d. We denote with U S the uniform probability distribution on the set of secrets S. In Section 3 we will show how to improve this bound for any tree.
The following results, proved in 9] and 42] will be used to obtain good secret sharing schemes for graphs with maximum degree 3: Theorem 2.2 Let C n be a cycle of length n; n 5: For any set of secrets S of size q 2 , with q n, a secret sharing scheme for C n exists with optimal information rate 2=3:
The following lemmas have been proved by Capocelli, De Santis, Gargano, and Vaccaro 15]; we will use them to nd new upper bounds on the information rate of access structures. Since their proofs are simple, we report them for reader's convenience. Lemma 2.2 Let A be an access structure on a set P of participants and X; Y P. Let 
In 9] it is proved that if T is the optimal solution to O(G) then (G) 1=T .
Upper Bounds on the Information Rate and Average Information Rate
In this section we will exhibit an access structure having optimal information rate less than 2/3.
This solves an open problem in 9]. The result is obtained using the entropy approach of 15].
Consider the graph AS k = (V (AS k ); E(AS k )), k 1, where V (AS k ) = fY 0 ; X 0 ; X 1 ; : : :; X k ; X k+1 ; : : :; X 2k g and E(AS k ) = f(Y 0 ; X 0 ); (X 0 ; X 1 ); : : :; (X 0 ; X k ); (X 1 ; X k+1 ); : : :; (X k ; X 2k )g: As an example, the graph AS k for k = 3 is depicted in Figure 1 :a. 
From (1) Thus, the optimal information rate of AS k is 1=2 + 1=(4k + 2). The optimal average information rate equal to 2=3 + 2=(9k + 6) is attained by either 1 or 2 .
In case the probability distribution on the set of secrets is the uniform one, we obtain the following result, whose proof is immediate using Theorem 3.1 and inequality (2) of Appendix A.
Corollary 3.1 Suppose p S (s) = 1=jSj, for any s 2 S. Then any secret sharing scheme for the access structure AS k must give to at least a participant a share whose size is at least 2 ? 1=(k + 1)
times the size of the secret.
Theorem 3.1 is a generalization of Theorem 4:1 of 15]. In fact if we choose k = 1 the access structure AS k is the closure of the edge-set of P 3 , the path on four vertices. In Appendix B are depicted all graphs on six vertices that have AS 2 as induced subgraph and, therefore, have optimal information rate less than 3=5. It turns out that the optimal information rate for all those graphs is equal to 3=5, and all but one have also an optimal average information rate equal to 3=4. Using Theorem 3.1 we can show the existence of access structures having average information rate less than 2/3, which represented the best upper bound known so far 15] on average information rate.
Consider the graph M k ; where V (M k ) = fX 1 ; X 2 ; : : :; X 2k+3 ; X 2k+4 g and E(M k ) = fX 1 X 2 g fX 2 X i ; X i X k+i ; X k+i X 2k+3 j3 i k + 2g fX 2k+3 X 2k+4 g: The graph M 3 and a CMC that attains the optimal average information rate are depicted in Figure   2 . The following theorem holds. 
A NP-completeness Result
A close look to the proof of the upper bound in Theorem 3.1 shows that it can be applied also to any access structure A on 2k + 2 participants, Y 0 ; X 0 ; X 1 ; : : :; X 2k ; such that the set A-allowed de ned as A-allowed = fY 0 X 0 g fX 0 X i ; X i X k+i j1 i kg is in the access structure, i.e., A-allowed A, but the set A-forbidden de ned as A-forbidden = fX 1 X 2 : : :X k Y 0 g fY 0 X k+1 g fX 1 : : :X i Y 0 X k+i+1 j1 i k ? 1g has no intersection with the access structure, i.e., A-forbidden T A = ;. Let B k be the set of all access structures which satisfy the above requirements. The sequence (X 1 ; X 2 ; : : :; X k ) is called the children list of access structure A (the name is inspired by the fact that the set A-allowed has the form of a tree). To maintain simpler notation we denote a set fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : :; a n g by the sequence a 1 a 2 : : :a n . In case the access structure is the closure of a graph, the set A-forbidden can be written as A-forbidden-edges = fY 0 X i j1 i 2kg fX i X j j1 i < j kg fX i X k+j j1 i < j kg:
Let A be an access structure on a set P of participants. Given a subset of participants P 0 P, we de ne the access structure induced by P 0 as the family of sets A P 0 ] = fx 2 Ajx P 0 g. Extending Above theorem gives an upper bound on the information rate of access structures given that the access structure induced by a subset of participants is in B k . We will use above theorem to get upper bounds on the optimal information rate and on the optimal average information rate of several graphs with six vertices, extending the results of 9] that computed the information rate of all graphs with ve vertices. Unfortunately, testing for above property in general is an hard computational problem, as we show that this is NP{complete. Let A be an access structure, a set C 2 A is a minimal set of A if A 6 2 A whenever A C. De ne the B k {INDUCED{SUBSTRUCTURE problem as follows: Given a set of participants P, an access structure A de ned by the family of minimal sets which can recover the secret and a positive integer k 3, determine if there is a subset P 0 P such that the induced access structure A P 0 ] is in B k . Theorem 3.4 B k {INDUCED{SUBSTRUCTURE is NP{complete.
Proof. (For de nition of NP{complete problems and notation used in this proof, we refer the reader to 23].) It is easy to see that B k {INDUCED{SUBSTRUCTURE 2 NP, since a nondeterministic algorithm needs only guess participants Y 0 ; X 0 ; X 1 ; : : :; X 2k ; and check in polynomial time whether the set A-allowed is a subset of A and A-forbidden T A = ;. We transform 3SAT to B k {INDUCED{SUBSTRUCTURE. Let U = fu 1 ; u 2 ; : : :; u k?1 g; k 3; be a set of variables and C = fc 1 ; c 2 ; : : :; c m g be a set of clauses, each containing 3 literals. We will construct an access structure A on a set P of participants, such that there is a subset of participants P 0 P and the induced access structure A P 0 ] is in B k if and only if C is satis able.
There are 4k participants in P: Four participants y 0 ; x 0 ; v; v 0 , and for each variable u i 2 U there are four participants u i ; u i ; u 0 i ; u 0 i in P.
The The construction can be accomplished in polynomial time. We now show that C is satis able if and only if there is a subset of participants P 0 P whose induced access structure A P 0 ] is in B k . Suppose P 0 is a set of participants such that A P 0 ] 2 B k . Recalling the de nition of A 1 , we have that v 2 P 0 and for each pair fu i ; u i g, i = 1; 2; : : :; k?1, exactly one element is in P 0 . Consider the truth assignment t : U ! fT; Fg de ned as follows: If u i 2 P 0 then t(u i ) = T, else t(u i ) = F. Let c i 2 C be a clause consisting of litterals w i;1 ; w i;2 ; w i;3 . Since w i;1 w i;2 w i;3 is in A 3 , then the three elements w i;1 ; w i;2 ; w i;3 cannot be all in P 0 , otherwise A P 0 ] 6 2 B k since fw i;1 w i;2 w i;3 g 2 A-forbidden. If w i;j 6 2 P 0 , for j 2 f1; 2; 3g, then t(w i;j ) = T and clause c i is satis able. On the other hand, assume that t : U ! fT; Fg is a satisfying truth assignment for C. In this section we will give several general lower bounds on the information rate and on the average information rate of access structures represented by graphs. Our lower bounds are obtained, as customary, assuming an uniform probability distribution on the set of secrets. Let us denote the uniform probability distribution on the set of secrets S with U S .
It is an open problem to determine similar bounds when arbitrary probability distributions on the secrets are assumed. A few results in this directions are contained in 15]. We rst recall the following theorem by Brickell and Davenport in 12] stating that a complete bibartite graph admits an ideal secret sharing scheme. Since we will use this result several times, we repeat the proof for the reader convenience Proof. Let V 1 and V 2 be the parts of G, an ideal secret sharing for G can be constructed as follows. Let q 2 be an integer. Consider S = Z q . If the secret is s 2 S, then the dealer randomly chooses an element 2 Z q and computes an element 2 Z q such that s = + mod q. The dealer gives the share to all participants in V 1 and the share to all participants in V 2 . It is obvious that this realizes a secret sharing scheme with information rate equal to 1.
We rst improve on the bound of Theorem 2.1 for graphs with n vertices and odd maximum degree d. Proof. Let Adj(X), Inc(X), degree one(X) be the following sets : Adj(X) = fY : (X; Y ) 2 E(G)g is the set of vertices adjacent to X. Inc(X) = f(X; Y ) : (X; Y ) 2 E(G)g is the set of edges incident to X. Finally, degree one(X) = fY 2 Adj(X) : jInc(Y )j = 1g is the set of vertices adjacent to X with degree 1. We will prove the theorem in the case jSj = 2 n , the construction can be easyly extended to the general case jSj = q n and q 2. For a vertex X 2 V (G) de ne G X as the subgraph of G such that V (G X ) = fXg S Adj(X) and E(G X ) = Inc(X): The graph G X is a complete multipartite graph and by Theorem 4.1 there is a secret sharing scheme for G X with information rate 1. Let G 0 be the graph with vertices V (G 0 ) = V (G) ? (fXg S degree one(X)) and edge-set E(G 0 ) = E(G) ? Inc(X): Assume that the secret consists of a single bit. If we use the secret sharing scheme described in Theorem 3.8 of 14] for G 0 , then each vertex in Adj(X)
T V (G 0 ) gets at most d(d?1)=2e+1 bits while all other vertices get at most dd=2e + 1 bits. We realize a secret sharing scheme for G by using both the scheme for G X and the scheme for G 0 . In the resulting scheme the vertex X receives only one bit, the vertices in Adj(X) , with q n, there exits a secret sharing scheme with information rate equal to 2=3. For a secret of 2 log q bits, the scheme gives only 3 log q bits to all vertices of the cycle. If a cycle has lenght four then from Theorem 4.1 there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme for any set of secrets S of size 2; whereas if a cycle has lenght three, then from the main theorem of 12] there exists an ideal secret sharing scheme for any set of secrets S of size 3. From Theorem 2.1 we know that, for any set of secrets S of size 2, there is a secret sharing scheme for any tree with information rate equal to 1=2. For a secret of 2 log q bits, the scheme given in 9] distributes only 2 log q bits to the leaves of the tree while all other vertices get 4 log q bits. We now realize a secret sharing scheme for G; by sharing a secret consisting of 2 log q separately in each tree T 1 ; : : :; T m and cycle C 1 ; : : :; C r . A vertex of G of degree one can only be a leaf of a three so it receives 2 log q bits. If a vertex has degree two then either it belongs to a cycle, receiving 3 log q bits, or it is an internal node of a three and it receives 4 log q bits. If a vertex has degree three then it belongs to a cycle and it is the leave of a tree, receiving 5 log q bits in total. Any vertex of the graph cannot be an internal vertex of a tree and belong to a cycle, would it be otherwise it should have degree four contradicting the hypothesis. Thus, we can construct a secret sharing scheme for G, giving to each vertex a share of at most 5 log q bits for a secret of 2 log q bits. This scheme has information rate 2=5. Regardless of the degree, it is possible to obtain better bounds for trees. We recall that an internal node is a vertex of degree greater than one. Theorem 4.4 Let G be a tree with n internal vertices. Then for any set of secrets S of size q n , with q 2, there exists a secret sharing scheme with information rate (G; U S ; ) = n 2n ? 1 : Proof. We will prove the theorem in the case jSj = 2 n , the construction can be easyly extended to the general case jSj = q n and q 2. In 9] it was showed how to obtain a secret sharing scheme for any tree with information rate equal to 1=2. This scheme, for a secret consisting of a single bit, gives one bit to a predeterminated vertex X 2 V (G) and to all non-internal vertices, whereas each other vertex gets two bits. Assume that the secret consists of n bits. Consider the scheme that for each bit of the secret distributes it by choosing as a predetermined vertex X each vertex of G in turn. This scheme, for a secret of n bits, gives to each vertex at most 2(n ? 1) + 1 = 2n ? 1 bits. In this last part of the paper we present general lower bounds on the optimal information rate and optimal average information rate for any graph G with n vertices. The lower bounds are obtained by using known results on the covering of the edges of a graphs by means of complete bipartite graphs. Tuza 44] proved that the edge-set of an arbitrary graph G can be covered by complete bipartite subgraphs G 1 (V (G 1 ); E(G 1 )); : : :; G T (V (G T ); E(G T )) such that
=2 log n+ o(n 2 = log n). We now use again Theorem 4.1, namely that there exists a secret sharing scheme for each G i with information rate equal to 1. We can construct a secret sharing scheme for G by sharing the secret separetely in each G i . In this way we need to generate a total of 3n 2 =2 log n+o(n 2 = log n) shares, each of them of the same size as the secret. Thus, we get that the average size of a share given to any participant is less than 3n=2 log n + o(n= log n). Therefore, we get that the optimal average information rate for any graph G with n vertices is greater than n times the inverse of 3n 2 =2 log n + f(n), where jf(n)j < n 2 = log n, for all > 0 and su ciently large n. Thus, the average information rate is greater than 2 log n=3n + g(n), where jg(n)j (2 =3( + 3=2)) logn=n, if jf(n)j < n 2 = log n. Feder and Motwani 21] proved that the problem of partitioning the edges of a graph G into complete bipartite graphs such that the sum of the cardinalities of their vertex sets is minimized is NP{complete. However, they proved that the edge set of a graph G = (V; E), with jV j = n and jEj = m can be partitioned into complete bipartite graphs with sum of the cardinalities of their vertex sets O( m log n 2 m log n ), and presented an e cient algorithm to compute such a partition. Using their result and again sharing the secret in each complete bipartite graph with Brickell and Davenport's algorithm, it follows that there is a secret sharing scheme with average information rate at least ( n log n m log n 2 m ). Finally, we recall a result of Erd os and Pyber 20] (see also 34]) which states that edges of a graph G with n vertices can be partitioned into complete bipartite graphs such that each vertex of G is contained by at most O(n= log n) complete bipartite graphs. This result, together with Theorem 4.1, directly implies that the optimal information rate of G is (G) = log n n :
These results can be summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5 Let G be a graph with n vertices and m edges. Then, for any set of secrets S of size q 2 there exist secret sharing schemes 1 and 2 with average information rate e (G; U S ; 1 ) > 2 log n 3n + o log n n ; and e (G; U S ; 2 ) = n log n m log n 2 m ! ; respectively. Moreover, there exists a secret sharing scheme 3 with information rate (G; U S ; 3 ) = log n n :
the same edge. To avoid overburdening the notation we often describe a graph G by the list of all edges E(G): We will use reciprocally (X; Y ) and XY to denote the edge joining the vertices X and Y: G is connected if any two vertices are joined by a path. The complete graph K n is the graph on n vertices in which any two vertices are joined by an edge. The complete multipartite graph K n1;n2;:::;nt is a graph on P t i=1 n i vertices, in which the vertex set is partitioned into subsets of size n i (1 i t) In this appendix we analyze all graphs who have optimal information rate less than 2=3 accordingly to Theorem 3.3. The schemes for these graphs are obtained by using the Multiple Construction Technique 9] based on complete multipartite coverings of the graph. The optimal information rate is not greater than 3=5 and the optimal average information rate is less than or equal to 3=4 for all graphs from Theorem 3.3. All these results are summarized in Table 1 , and the rst CMC of each graph gives the scheme with average information rate showed in Table 1 . Below are depicted some of the minimal CMCs for 5 graphs on 6 vertices. 
